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STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTUAL BACKGROUND
“We

know how

it is t0 establish the standard 0f care. There is no doctor in the
an out 0f state expert t0 acquaint himself with the standard 0f care
so he can sue somebody that's practicing in the community where he’s working. There’s a
code 0f silence. I don't think it’s hard t0 see that its very, very challenging for a Plaintiff to
bring a case in this state given what the legislature has said needs t0 be done.”

all

state that

wants

difﬁcult

t0 talk t0

--Justice

John R. Stegner, Oral Argument, Eldridge v. West,
Sup. Ct. Docket N0. 45214, May 10, 2019.

A. Nature 0f the Case and Course 0f Proceedings Below.
This

is

a medical malpractice case,

dismissed after the

Plaintiffs/Appellants failed t0 produce admissible evidence

showing

had actual knowledge of the applicable standard 0f health care

trial

court ruled that the

that their expert witnesses

practice. R. 2172.

Throughout the

course 0f proceedings, the Appellants timely provided disclosures and laid ample foundation that
their experts

were familiar with the

local standard. This issue is

in medical negligence cases as misapplication

ofparamount concern to

plaintiffs

0f Idaho case law has led t0 the dismissal of many

deserving cases that should have been tried on the merits.

The Complaint and Demand
were ﬁled shortly thereafter, and the
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for Jury Trial

parties

was ﬁled 0n March

1,

2017. R. 17-27. Answers

commenced the discovery process.

In April 2018, the

Defendants filed Motions to Strike the Plaintiffs’ expert witnesses and Motions for Summary
Judgment. R. 687-689; 843-845; 1452-1454. Plaintiffs responded, providing the trial court with
declarations from multiple expert witnesses. R. 1540-1724. Argument was held on May 23, 2017,
the trial court issued its decision granting summary judgement on May 31, 2018 and entering
Judgment on June 7, 2018. R. 1829-1886; 1891-1893.
The Plaintiffs timely filed their Motion for Reconsideration on June 21, 2018. R. 19241926. Argument was held October 10, 2018. The trial court issued its decision denying the
Plaintiffs’ motion on November 13, 2018, and Judgment was entered on December 3, 2018. R.
2171-2192; 2193-2197. The Plaintiffs filed their Notice of Appeal on December 21, 2018. R.
2198-2207.
B. Statement of Facts.
1. Ms. Fisk’s treatment at Northwest.
North Idaho Day Surgery (“Northwest”) is a specialty acute care hospital in Post Falls,
Idaho. R. 2172. Dr. Jeffrey D. McDonald (“McDonald”) is board certified in neurological surgery.
Id. On March 10, 2015, McDonald performed an out-patient cervical spinal fusion on Ms. Fisk at
the Northwest facility. Id. Northwest provided the facility as well as the nursing care before,
during and after the surgery. Id. Jessica Sholtz (“Sholtz”), a nurse practitioner and mid-level
employee of McDonald, assisted him. Id.
On the morning of March 11, 2015, the process to discharge Ms. Fisk from the hospital
was underway when she began experiencing tremendous abdominal pain that escalated to nausea,
vomiting and bowel issues. R. 1541.

In response, the hospital nursing staff prescribed a

suppository for constipation. Id. At approximately 3:00 p.m., Ms. Fisk experienced a large emesis
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(vomiting) that was reported to Sholtz. Ms. Fisk’s condition continued to worsen throughout the
day into the evening. Id.
As noted by the trial court relying on the Declaration of the Plaintiffs’ expert Suzanne
Nebeker, between 7:45 p.m. and 9:00 p.m., Ms. Fisk continued to experience nausea with
intermittent retching emesis and severe abdominal pain. Id. At 1:26 a.m., on the morning of March
12, 2015, Ms. Fisk reported to staff that she felt like she was dying. She vomited what was
described as a coffee-ground emesis, brown liquid. R. 1831. At 2:30 a.m., she again vomited a
coffee-ground emesis.

Id.

The nursing staff at Northwest consulted with Sholtz, who

recommended that they call the on-call intensivist. Id. The intensivist, a nephrologist, was called
and recommended that Ms. Fisk be transferred immediately to Kootenai Medical Center for a
gastrointestinal consult and a possible endoscopy. Id. This recommendation was relayed to Sholtz
who instructed the nursing staff to keep Ms. Fisk at Northwest. Id. Over the next several hours
her condition continued to deteriorate.
At this point—Ms. Fisk had severe abdominal pain reported at a level 10 for hours, nausea,
vomiting and changes in her level of consciousness. She had not been seen by a physician or midlevel provider and the only physician contacted recommended transport to a higher level of care.
That sole instruction was refused by Sholtz and not followed by the nursing staff at Northwest.
At 6:45 a.m. on the morning of the 12th, Sholtz was trying to coordinate a gastrointestinal
consult. Id. At 7:45 a.m., the staff at Northwest noted that Ms. Fisk’s abdomen was distended and
firm with no audible bowel sounds and her pain remained at a 10 out of 10. Id. Around that same
time Ms. Fisk was finally seen by physicians, McDonald and Dr. John L. Pennings. Id. Dr.
Pennings believed that she was in shock and ordered the hospital nursing staff to prepare her for
surgery. R. 1831 -1832.
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When he performed an exploratory laparotomy, he discovered that Ms. Fisk had likely
developed mesenteric artery ischemia a condition causing a loss of blood supply to the small
intestines leading to end-organ loss. R. 1832. Dr. Pennings then removed a large amount of Ms.
Fisk’s small intestines as well as a total abdominal colectomy with an end ileostomy. Id. Ms. Fisk
was then transferred emergently to the Intensive Care Unit at Kootenai Medical Center in critical
condition. Id. Ms. Fisk remained on life support in the Intensive Care Unit for five (5) days. R. 22.
For more than twenty (20) hours Ms. Fisk agonized and declined in front of their eyes, no
action was taken. R. 1548. Ms. Fisk was nearly dead when she was seen by a doctor on the morning
of March 12, 2015, requiring immediate surgical intervention which was undertaken, and she lost
all but a foot of her bowels. R. 1548. The Complaint alleged a claim for negligence against
Defendant Northwest, Defendant McDonald and a third claim of negligence against the surgeon
that treated Ms. Fisk on the morning of March 12, 2015, Dr. John Pennings. Dr. Pennings was
dismissed from the litigation pursuant to Stipulation on January 26, 2018. R. 469-472.
2. Summary Judgment.
On April 3, 2018 Northwest filed its Motion to Strike Plaintiffs’ Expert Witness
Disclosures and Motion to Exclude Plaintiffs’ Experts as well as a Motion for Summary Judgment.
R. 687-689; 843 - 845. The thrust of the argument presented by Northwest was that plaintiffs
failed to produce any admissible expert testimony demonstrating that there was a violation of the
standard of care. R. 847 - 848. The primary argument relied upon by Northwest was that plaintiffs
failed to produce evidence that any of their experts had knowledge of the applicable standard of
care in the community. R. 854.
McDonald filed his Motion for Summary Judgment on April 24, 2018 adopting many of
the positions of Defendant Northwest. R. 1452 - 1454. The Plaintiffs responded to the defendants’
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motions on May 9, 2018. R. 1540 - 1587. In support of the response, the Plaintiffs provided the
Court with the Declaration of Suzanne Nebeker. R. 1619-1658; Declaration of Timothy F.
Hawkins, FACHE, CHSP. R. 1659 - 1678; Declaration of Robert Y. Uyeda, M.D., R. 1679 - 1690;
and Declaration of Dr. Vernon R. Kubiak, DNP, CNP, CNS, CNS-BC, PHHNP-BC, RN. R. 1691
- 1706.
The foundational support provided to the trial court demonstrating familiarity with the local
standard of care was complete. Dr. Kubiak established familiarity with the local standard of care
during the March, 2015, time frame in Post Falls, Idaho relying on the standard procedures adopted
by Northwest wherein it adopted the standards set forth by the American Nurses Association, Idaho
statutes applicable to nursing care in the State of Idaho, including Idaho Statues in Idaho Code
§18-1401, et seq., as well as IDAPA regulations in effect in March of 2015. In laying foundation
for his opinion, he also relied on deposition testimony and the medical record.
Ms. Nebeker provided the trial court with a declaration setting forth reliance on Northwest
policy and procedure, the deposition excerpts of Scholtz and the standards referenced by Dr.
Kubiak. In defining the standard of care, she elaborated on the applicable statewide standards, the
Idaho State Board of Nursing administration rules and applicable IDAPA rules. Timothy Hawkins
provided foundation that Northwest was a Joint Commission accredited facility and that national
standards applied. He relied on Joint Commission standards, CMS standards and a discussion with
a state Medicare official.
Robert Uyeda MD, provided the trial court with a declaration which detailed his review of
the medical records and medical provider depositions including that of Dr. Pennings. He also spoke
with the primary care physician of Ms. Fisk and concluded that his assessment of the standard of
care comported with the local standard of care in the Post Falls/Coeur d’Alene medical community.
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All Plaintiffs’ experts went far beyond these brief summaries to display their familiarity
with local standards. Detailed discussions of this appear later in this brief.

i. Defendants’ productions at summary judgment.
In support of its Motion for Summary Judgment Northwest submitted the Affidavit of
Jeffrey Larson M.D., and the Affidavit of Denise Fowler, R.N. R. 863 - 1380. Neither submission
described what the local standard of care was. These deficiencies are described in detail later in
this brief. In sum, Defendants failed in their burden of proof obligations to provide a description
of the standard of care.
McDonald did not offer any affidavits or evidence of compliance with the local standard
of care. He argued instead that the plaintiffs failed to provide evidence critical of his care.

ii. Evidence submitted by Appellants at summary judgment.
Absent the ability to talk with local care providers, [though Suzanne Nebeker and Robert
Uyeda did so] Appellants’ experts established their familiarity with the local standard through
other mechanisms. In response to the defendants’ motions for summary judgment, the plaintiffs
provided the trial court with substantial evidence including:
1. Deposition excerpts from McDonald and Scholtz as well as page 15 of McDonald’s
Answer to discovery (R. 1588-1618);
2. Declaration of Dr. Vernon R. Kubiak (R. 1691-1706);
3. Declaration of Robert Y. Uyeda (R. 1679-1690);
4. Declaration of Timothy F. Hawkins (R. 1659-1678); and
5. Declaration of Susanne Nebeker (R.1619-1658).
A careful review of the attached information yields significant information and evidence on all
elements required to survive summary judgment.
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a. Declaration of Dr. Vernon R. Kubiak.
Dr. Kubiak initiated his Declaration with discussion of the Affidavits of Denise Fowler and
Jeffery Larson, M.D. R. 1692. In paragraph 5 of his declaration he was critical of the Affidavit
of Denise Fowler, disagreeing that the standard of care is established by reference to the medical
record. R. 1692 at paragraph 5. Exhibit A to his Declaration was Kubiak’s Report that was
submitted as part of the plaintiffs’ expert witness designation. R. 1694 - 1706. He did an extremely
thorough review of the medical record, though not agreeing that its entries established a standard
of care.
Dr. Kubiak was retained to opine regarding the nursing care rendered to Ms. Fisk while a
patient. He concluded that the nursing care provided to Ms. Fisk was not consistent with and did
not comply with the standard of health care practice applicable to nurses and that the on-call
provider assigned to care for Ms. Fisk (Scholtz) did not respond appropriately to critical
information. R. 1694.
As foundation for his opinion Dr. Kubiak established that:
•

He reviewed the standards of nursing care present in Idaho during the March 2015
timeframe.

•

The standard procedures adopted by Northwest specifically state that the facility
follows the American Nurses Association standards.

•

He reviewed Idaho Statute §54-1401 and IDAPA 23 versions effective during March
2015 timeframe which establish a state wide standard.

•

He reviewed the medical record. R. 1694.

He then discussed the standard of health care practice applicable to the nursing care provided in
this case. R. 1695. In defining the standard of care he declared it to be established by the American
Nursing Association, ANA, (which was specifically adopted by the facility), the State Nurse
Practice Act (which sets forth the standard applicable to all nurses in the State of Idaho), the Joint
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Commission recommendation for accredited facilities (Northwest is so accredited), and applicable
hospital policies and procedures which he enumerated. R. 1695 - 1696.
Relying on the above references, with specific references to hospital adopted policies and
procedures, Dr. Kubiak discussed the standard of care specific to nursing care plans, pain
management, comfort and documentation. R. 1697 - 1698. He described the standards as applied
to the care of Ms. Fisk.
His ultimate opinion, based on the records provided and comparing that information to the
defined standard of care was that Ms. Fisk did not receive appropriate nursing care from March
11, 2015, through the morning of March 12, 2015, and that the Scholtz failed to recognize the
deteriorating condition of Ms. Fisk and take appropriate action. R. 1704. Dr. Kubiak discussed
the time frame in which he believed that Ms. Fisk reached a point where the nursing staff was
unable to adequately care for her. He concluded that by 0229 on March 12, 2015, Northwest
nurses should have realized that their efforts to reduce her pain level had failed completely. R.
1705.
Dr. Kubiak explained that there was a failure of the nurses to adequately inform Scholtz,
or that Scholtz failed to take appropriate action, or both. R. 1705. He reached this conclusion
based on the review of the record. The hospital staff claim to have informed Scholtz, while she
claims they did not. R. 1705. He continued to conclude that the nursing staff should have
recognized that Ms. Fisk was becoming hemodynamically compromised based on her vitals. R.
1705. In a candid opinion, Dr. Kubiak noted that discrepancies exist that prevent an exact
placement of blame as between Hospital staff and Jessica Sholtz. R. 1705.
Dr. Kubiak is a distinguished nurse, nurse practitioner, and educator in Pocatello. In his
first Declaration, he established that he knew the local standard of care with several references. R.
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1691 – 1706, especially 1694 – 1696. He reviewed pertinent Northwest rules and procedures. R.
1694. He found that the Hospital’s rules required compliance with American Nursing Association
[ANA] standards. Id. He therefore concluded that one measure of the local standard of care, based
on Northwest Specialty Hospital’s own rules, were the standards expressed by the ANA. He
evaluated the care provided accordingly.
Dr. Kubiak also relied on the guidelines of the Joint Commission, the primary accreditation
entity in the country. R. 1696. The interrelatedness of Joint Commission guidelines and standards
of care is highlighted in the filings of Appellants’ hospital procedures and safety expert, Timothy
Hawkins, below.
Dr. Kubiak also relied on Idaho Statutes and Regulations as defining the local standard. R.
1694 – 1695. Specifically, he stated that Idaho Code §54-1401, et seq., and IDAPA 23, were
requirements that must be followed in Idaho. There has been no rebuttal to the notion that a state
law or regulation dictates a standard of care for Idaho hospitals, and Kubiak’s reliance on both
hospital regulations and state law falls within guidelines established in Suhadolnik v. Pressman,
151 Idaho 110, 254 P3d 11 (2011): “where an expert demonstrates that a local standard of care has
been replaced by a statewide or national standard of care, and further demonstrates that he or she
is familiar with the statewide or national standard, the foundational requirements of Idaho Code §
6-1013 have been met.”
b. Declaration of Suzanne Nebeker.
In her declaration Ms. Nebeker sets forth that she reviewed the affidavits of Denise Fowler
and Jeffrey Larson and the expert designation of Rhonda Taylor. R. 1620. She also sets forth that
she reviewed the deposition of Jessica Scholtz and that the standards referenced in her report and
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that of Dr. Kubiak are standards that apply statewide in Idaho and specifically to Scholtz and
Northwest. R. 1620 at paragraph 5.
She opined that the nursing care of Ms. Fisk was not consistent with and did not comply
with the national and local standards of health care practice applicable to nurses in the local
community of Post Falls, Idaho. R. 1628. In discussing the standard of care applicable to Scholtz,
Ms. Nebeker cited the Idaho State Board of Nursing administrative rules which apply to all such
nurses in the State of Idaho. R. 1631. Scholtz was a nurse practitioner licensed by the State of
Idaho in March of 2015. R. 1631.
Scholtz was under the supervision of McDonald and was required to follow the state
licensing requirements and the policies and procedures of the hospital. R. 1631. Each of her
opinions related to the standard of care were in reference to State of Idaho standards setting forth
required standards in the state or to the American Nurses Association which was specifically
adopted by the hospital as the standard of care. R. 1627-1636. Additionally, she also cited IDAPA
provisions which are also applicable to the standard of care for Idaho nurses.
Suzanne Nebeker is a highly respected nurse practitioner who works in Salmon, Idaho, and
plays a prominent role in its local hospital. In her first declaration, incorporating a report she had
prepared, she addressed the issue of her knowledge of the local standard of care for nurses and
nurse practitioners in several manners. R. 1619 – 1658.
The foundations for Suzanne Nebeker’s knowledge of the local standard of care included
agreement with Vernon Kubiak’s (above) assessment of Northwest Specialty Hospital rules, the
ANA, State law, and National Standards. Ms. Nebeker is an expert on the Nursing Standards of
Practice as outlined by the American Nurses Association, [ANA], R. 1627, and the Nursing Scope
of Practices for the State of Idaho. R. 1627.
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To inform herself of the local standards, Suzanne Nebeker reviewed the designations of
McDonald’s expert witnesses, Denise Fowler, Jeffrey Larson, and Rhonda Taylor, nurses and
physicians. She also reviewed the deposition of Jessica Sholtz, Mc Donald’s employee and nurse
practitioner. R. 1620. In her initial Declaration, Suzanne Nebeker made it clear that the State and
national standards were the standards for Defendants: “I reiterate that all standards, which in my
opinion apply to nurses and nurse practitioners, referenced in my initial report and that of Vernon
Kubiak, are standards that apply statewide for the State of Idaho, to Sholtz, and to Northwest and
its staff.”
Suzanne Nebeker reviewed the By-Laws of Northwest. She reviewed medical records in
detail, R. 1620, and prepared a time-line of events, R. 1647 – 1656, which was adopted by the trial
court, R. 1830. She also reviewed the Rules and Regulations of the Medical Staff of Northwest. R.
1622. She reviewed Idaho’s Nursing Practice Act and the Idaho Administrative Rules of the Board
of Nursing. R. 1657.
Comparing the acts/omissions of Mc Donald’s employee nurse practitioner, Jessica Sholtz,
to the standards in the hospital rules, state laws and national standards, Ms. Nebeker’s assessment
was “the actions and omissions of Jessica Sholtz were, in a word, ‘indefensible.’” R. 1625.
Though lengthy, it is instructive to note the detail with which Suzanne Nebeker explained
portions of the Idaho Board of Nursing rules, applicable to all nurse practitioners in Idaho, R. 1631
– 1632:
Advance Practice Professional Nursing in the state of Idaho is defined by the State
the Idaho Board of Nursing through administrative rules governing the APRN. The
purpose of the rules is to promote, preserve, and protect public health, safety, and
welfare of the patient. The advanced practice nurse professional nurse is a
professional nurse licensed in the state who has gained additional specialized study
and is authorized to perform advanced nursing practice which may include acts of
diagnosing and treatment, and the prescribing, administering, and dispensing of
therapeutic pharmacologic and non-pharmacologic agents. A nurse practitioner is
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considered an Advance Practice Professional Nurse. The nurse practitioner shall

be currently licensed to practice as a professional nurse in Idaho, successfully
completed a nurse practitioner program Which is accredited by a national
organization recognized

by

the

Board of Nursing

in Idaho, pass a certiﬁcation

examination administered by an organization recognized by the board, hold current
national certiﬁcation
practitioner

when

from an organization recognized by the board The nurse

functioning within their recognized scope 0f practice, assume

primary responsibility for the care 0f their patients. This practice incorporates the
use of professional judgment in the assessment and management 0f wellness and
conditions

appropriate to the advance practice professional nurse’s

specialization.

Standards

for

the

area 0f

advanced practice professional nurse are

established for the safe practice, t0 serve as a guide for evaluation 0f the
practice to determine if

it is

safe

and

effective.

The advance

APRN

practice professional

nurse shall practice in a manner consistent with the deﬁnition 0f advance practice
professional nursing and the standards set forth in the rules. 280- 02:

The

APRN

may

provide services for which they are educationally prepared and for which
competence has been attained and maintained. 280-02-a: The APRN shall consult

and collaborate With other members of the health care team. 280-02-b The APRN
shall recognize her limits 0f knowledge and experience and shall consult and
collaborate With and refer to other health care professionals as appropriate.280-02c The APRN shall retain professional accountability for advance practice
professional nursing care according to the APRN scope of practice and the IDAPA
23.01 .01 “Rules 0fthe Board ofNursing” subsections 400.01 and 400.02. 280-02e The APRN shall assess clients, identify problems 0r conditions, establish
diagnosis, develop and implement plans and evaluate patient outcomes. 280-02g The APRN shall use critical thinking and independent decision making,
commensurate with the autonomy, authority, and responsibility 0f the practice
category. 280-05 The nurse practitioner shall practice in accord with the standards
established

by

American Nurses Credentialing Center, and the American
Practitioners.
Nurse practitioners Who meet qualifying

the

Academy 0f Nurse

requirements and are licensed by the board may perform comprehensive health
assessments, diagnosis, health promotion and direct management 0f acute and
chronic illnesses and disease as deﬁned
practice.

The nurse

by

the nurse practitioner’s scope 0f

practitioner shall practice with supervision

and provide for

appropriate medical consultation, collaborative management, and referral.

Suzanne Nebeker provided an extensive and detailed description 0f laws and guidelines

which apply universally and uniformly — including
d’Alene,

Mc

Donald and

convincing t0 a

trial

court

his

bound

t0 the notion that a conversation

Declaration 0f Timothy F. Hawkins.
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Northwest Specialty Hospital in Coeur

employee nurse practitioner Sholtz.

be included in the process.
c.

at the

This, however,

was not

With some local provider must

Mr. Hawkins is a hospital administration expert. He is an expert on the Joint Commission
and CMS Conditions of Participation Standards for hospitals and Outpatient facilities. R. 1662.
He notes that Northwest holds itself out in the community as accredited by the Joint Commission
and that the Joint Commission as well as the CMS Conditions of Participation are national
standards to be adhered to by all hospitals receiving Medicare funding. R. 1664.
Mr. Hawkins established that the Joint Commission standards applied to Northwest and
detailed the various standards that specifically apply to the care and treatment of Ms. Fisk. R.
1665. He identified concrete requirements established by the Joint Commission and identified
non-compliance on the part of the hospital. The compliance issues centered on the failure of the
hospital to have written policy and procedure for recognizing and responding to a patient’s
worsening condition. R. 1665. This is a concrete requirement with clear ramifications as applied
to the care of Ms. Fisk.
Hawkins identified this lack of policy and direction as a facility breakdown where the
nursing staff did not have clear guidance on what to do given Ms. Fisk’s changing and deteriorating
condition. R. 1666. He then identified another facility breakdown involving the failure of the chief
nursing officer to be elevate the care of Ms. Fisk as required by the cited Joint Commission rule.
R. 1667-1668.
The third standard identified by Hawkins involved providing consistent services. R. 1668.
He discussed the failure of the facility to conduct diagnostic intervention thorough the use of the
available CAT scan. R. 1669. His ultimate opinions are set forth on pages 1669 - 1670 of the
record identifying facility non-compliance with the Joint Commission standards.
As noted, Timothy Hawkins is an expert in hospital administration, regulations and
safety. He was presented by Plaintiffs to testify concerning shortcomings in Northwest Specialty
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Hospital’s policies and protocols, as well as the interrelationships between the Hospital’s
administration, nursing at the Hospital and Mc Donald and his employee nurse practitioner, Jessica
Sholtz.
There are obviously no local hospital administrators available to establish a standard of
care. Northwest and Kootenai are the only two, and their activities and medical staffs are
inextricably interwoven. Therefore, as above, Appellants were not able to establish the local
standards “from the ground up,” through consultation with “locals.” The establishment of the local
standard of care necessarily involved evaluating Northwest Specialty Hospital’s policies,
procedures, and the actions/inactions of its staff from the perspective of national standards adopted
locally.
In his first declaration, R. 1659 – 1678, Timothy Hawkins explained that Northwest
represents itself to be accredited by the Joint Commission, the largest healthcare accreditation
organization in America. R. 1664. The Hospital was also under contract with CMS and
Medicare. Mr. Hawkins demonstrated his familiarity with the facts of this case through review of
Hospital discovery responses, depositions of doctors and nurses involved in the care of Margaret
Fisk, Northwest standards and policies, Hospital By-Laws, nursing notes and other care records
for Margaret Fisk, hospital rules and regulations, and Joint Commission documents. R. 1677.
Mr. Hawkins confirmed, through contact with Mr. Dennis Kelly of the Idaho Department
of Health and Welfare, that Northwest was a CMS facility and “subject all CMS standards and
guidelines (CMS Conditions of Participation).” R. 1660. Mr. Hawkins’ Declaration noted that “I
am informed that in Idaho, all such facilities are required to comply with CMS requirements and
that their geographic location does not alter that requirement.” R. 1660.
Succinctly stated, the national standards were the local standards for every CMS facility in
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Idaho, regardless of location. Those standards were expressed through the Joint Commission.

CMS

requires that

participants have appropriate policies, procedures

its

place for the safety and care of

its

participants.

and protocols

in

Hospitals satisfy this national standards

requirement through accreditation by the Joint Commission and adoption ofpolicies in compliance

With the Joint Commission standards and guidelines. R. 1664.

CMS,

By Virtue

of its relationships With

Medicare, and the Joint Commission, the national standards 0f these entities were the

mandated

local standards for

Northwest Specialty Hospital.

The balance 0f Mr. Hawkins’

standards, their relationship to the case, and

standards.

Among

Commission

First Declaration outlined pertinent Joint

how Northwest

the shortcomings described

Specialty Hospital

fell

short of the

were the absence of appropriate procedures

for

recognizing patient deterioration, failures to react promptly and sufﬁciently t0 Margaret Fisk’s
rapidly deteriorating condition, deﬁciencies in the nursing “chain 0f

as failures

by the nursing

At the

initial

staff t0 react promptly,

and discrepancies

summary judgment hearing, and in its

command”

policies, as well

in policies.

opinion, the Court expressed ignorance

of the exact nature of Mr. Hawkins’ testimony. “The Fisks seem t0 have retained Hawkins t0
testify as to the local standard

added.

And the trial

.”
.

.

R. 1857, emphasis

court dismissed consideration of Mr. Hawkins” opinion at least partly 0n the

misunderstanding that
relied

0f care for the administration of a hospital

CMS

and Joint Commission standards are

only 0n the Joint Commission.

R.

1868.

different, but that

Mr. Hawkins

For that and other reasons, Appellants

supplemented Mr. Hawkins’ testimony With a Second Declaration.
d.

Declaration 0f Robert Y. Uyeda, M.D.

Robert Y. Uyeda, M.D.,
t0 practice in the states
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J.D., F.A.C.S., is a physician

and surgeon with medical licenses

of California and Nevada, and inactive license in

state

0f Washington; he

was certified by the American Board of Surgery and a current Fellow of American College of
Surgeons. He trained in surgery residency at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center, Los Angeles, CA, Dept.
of Surgery; and has an active practice in General Surgery, including surgery of abdomen and
gastrointestinal tract from 1982 to 2017 in County of Los Angeles. He was presented by Plaintiffs
to testify concerning his familiarity with the standard of care, general medical knowledge, and
knowledge in his specialty in surgery, applicable to providers in care of hospitalized patients who
suffer from acute onset of unexplained severe abdominal pain out of proportion to physical
findings. Though primarily a causation expert, Dr. Uyeda tried to learn local standards of care.
Dr. Uyeda in his Declaration stated his opinions with a reasonable medical probability and
that he consulted with a local physician, Dr. Scott Dunn, who is Margaret Fisk’s physician on
issues concerning local standards of care. Based upon that contact he believed that the medical
opinions he expressed comport with the local standards of practice in the Post Falls/Coeur d’Alene
area, particularly with reference to the need for Dr. McDonald’s nurse practitioner Sholtz to have
personally examined Mrs. Fisk in the evening March 11, 2015, and the need to involve a medical
doctor in the care and assessment much earlier than the engagement of the interventionist in the
early morning hours, of March 12, 2015.
He affirmed his medical opinion that in almost any setting, a person presenting
symptomatology like Mrs. Fisk, especially at an abdominal pain level of 10 with accompanying
symptoms, could be properly assessed with a CT scan procedure. The CT procedure would in
medical probability, likely establish intestinal deterioration. The CT procedure would eliminate
many, if not all, alternative explanations other than ischemic bowel, in a differential diagnosis
process. It is my opinion that the failure to perform the CT scan in the late afternoon to evening
hours of March 11, 2015, was substandard care. Based on my inquiries concerning standard of
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care the CT scan should have been done at Northwest Specialty hospital, or perhaps more
appropriately, Mrs. Fisk should have been transferred at the time of the reports of these symptoms
and would have obtained a CT scan upon transfer.
He stated that in his medical opinion an ischemic bowel is a common enough medical
problem that it should always be part of a differential diagnosis and should always be a matter that
must be ruled out with appropriate medical assessment and testing which was not done in the case
of Mrs. Fisk.

iii. The District Court’s Memorandum Decision and Order on Summary
Judgment.
In the submitted declarations and reports the Plaintiffs’ experts detailed the foundation for
their opinions to include their familiarity with the local standard of care. The trial court recognized
six (6) arguments made by Northwest in its Motion to Strike the plaintiffs retained experts. R.
1841. The Court declined to grant Northwest’s Motions to Strike the plaintiffs’ various healthcare
experts because expert designations were not required to comply with Idaho Code §6-1012, 61013 and 6-1014. R. 1840-1853.
With respect to Northwest’s Motion for Summary Judgment the court considered three
issues: 1) Whether the plaintiffs produced admissible evidence that their expert witnesses had
actual knowledge of the applicable standard of care; 2) Whether the plaintiffs produced admissible
evidence that Northwest’s conduct was the actual and proximate cause of Ms. Fisk’s injury; and
3) The burden of proof applicable to Northwest’s motion. R. 1854. The court reviewed the
plaintiffs’ submissions from Dr. Uyeda, Dr. Kubiak, Suzanne Nebeker, and Timothy Hawkins and
determined that each was unfamiliar with the local standard of care. R. 1854-1868.
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The court went on to hold that the plaintiffs submitted admissible evidence on the element
of causation through Dr. Uyeda. R. 1869.
The court also granted Defendant McDonald’s Motion for Summary Judgment ruling that
the plaintiffs failed to plead that McDonald was vicariously liable for the acts and omissions of his
nurse practitioner and that they failed to demonstrate actual knowledge of the local standard of
care for a nurse practitioner. R. 1880-1884.
In its Memorandum Decision and Order the court concluded with a miscellaneous
observation acknowledging that Ms. Fisk sustained serious injury and damage and that there was
enough evidence on the issue of causation that would have allowed her claims to survive summary
judgment. R. 1885. The dismissal of her claims, as set forth by the court, was due to insufficient
evidence presented at the summary judgment juncture regarding the local standard of care. R.
1885.

iv. Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration.
On June 21, 2018, the plaintiffs filed their Motion for Reconsideration. R. 1924-1926. The
plaintiffs took no position on the Court’s analysis associated with the Motion to Strike and
ultimately argued that the plaintiffs’ experts demonstrated adequate familiarity with the local
standard of care contrary to the trial court’s determination at summary judgment. R. 1930.
In support of the Motion for Reconsideration, the plaintiffs provided additional
declarations from Dr. Kubiak and Ms. Nebeker.
a. Second Declaration of Dr. Kubiak.
To assist the trial court’s understanding of the issues, Vernon Kubiak provided a Second
Declaration to clarify how he had familiarized himself with local standards. R. 1953 – 1969. He
clarified his comments on the ANA Standards with references to depositions he reviewed. R.
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1954. He explained, again, that a hospital’s own rules and procedures are statements of its standard
of care. “The rules and regulations of Northwest Specialty Hospital are a definite statement of that
facility’s guidelines for practice, applied locally.” R. 1954. He emphasized that the nurses’
depositions he reviewed demonstrated that nurses knew that their standard of care was defined [in
part] by the ANA guidelines. R. 1954.
Vernon Kubiak then went into greater detail, itemizing hospital rules and the ANA and how
they defined a local standard of care, R. 1955:
7. As illustrations of my assessment of the local standard of care, I am providing
examples, not meant to be fully exhaustive, of information I obtained pertinent to the
local standard of care from the sources listed above:
a. Hospital protocol 1015-00-001 provides that the ANA is the standard that applied
to NWSH.
b. Nurse Hetzler testified in her deposition, at page 15, that the ANA guidelines for
practice were known to her and that the ANA guidelines were incorporated into the
NWSH protocols. [Hetzler p. 15.]
c. Nurse Miller testified in her deposition that her training included the ANA
guidelines, that they used them to “guide everything in nursing,” and that she
understood that NWSH incorporated the ANA guidelines into its protocols and
nurses were expected to act in accordance with those guidelines. [Miller pp. 29,
30.]
d. As stated, I accepted the Hospital’s own protocols, and rules and regulations as
statements of the local standard of care.
e. I considered the testimony of nurse Miller, at pages 82 through 87 of her deposition
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regarding NWSH protocols, or their absence, as further indicators of the local
standards of care for NWSH. This discussion was pertinent because it also shed
light on the nurses’ perceptions of their ability to counter an order from nurse
practitioner Sholtz concerning transfer of Ms. Fisk.
f. I also considered further deposition testimony of nurse Miller concerning other
NWSH protocols as indicative of local standards of practice, for example
administration of medications, [Miller deposition p. 91] nursing assessments, [p.
104-5] pain management, [p. 107] and charting, [p. 109].
g. Nurse Miller’s deposition also provided information about practices at NWSH. As
an example, nurse Miller explained her understanding of circumstances in which a
nurse would communicate with a physician or nurse practitioner. [Miller
deposition pp. 20 – 27.]
Taken as a whole, Vernon Kubiak’s Declaration demonstrated that he adequately informed
himself of the local standards of practice for the case. Dr. Kubiak’s extremely detailed analysis of
the substandard and non-compliant actions/inactions of Northwest Specialty personnel and
McDonald’s nurse practitioner, Sholtz, will not be detailed as the essential issue on appeal is the
standard of care matter, not how those standards were violated.
b. Supplemental Declarations from Suzanne Nebeker.
To address concerns expressed by the trial court, Suzanne Nebeker performed additional
analysis and gathered additional information. This is reflected in her Second Declaration, R. 1941
– 1952.
In her second Declaration, Ms. Nebeker elaborated on her approach to the local standard
matter, referencing prior filings on the issue and stating, R. 1942:
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I

explained and wrote extensively about the American Nurses’ Association

[ANA]

and that organization’s guidelines and standards. I also noted that I had read and
reviewed the depositions of nurses Robin Hetzler, Coleen Miller, nurse practitioner
Jessica Sholtz, and Dr. Jeffrey McDonald. I also detailed that I had considered
Northwest Specialty Hospital Rules and Regulations. I believed that those
references, taken cumulatively, adequately informed me of the standards of care
and practice applicable to this case. The rules and regulations 0f Northwest
Specialty Hospital are a deﬁnite statement of that facility’s guidelines for practice,
applied locally.
The depositions informed With respect t0 the nurses’
understandings that they were expected t0 comply with the ANA, interpreted by me
as another aspect of statements ofthe local standard 0f care for the treatment ost.
Fisk.

She also referenced, as examples, the same materials as Vernon Kubiak, above, R. 1943 — 1944.
Suzanne Nebeker also expanded 0n her descriptions 0f
assisted her in determining the local standard

of

care. R.

how

Idaho Nursing Regulations

1944 — 1948.

Summarized, these

The

regulations cover a broad scope of rules t0 be followed in any Idaho facility.

disregard of IDAPA regulations on the grounds that they don’t prescribe

provided by the caretakers,

Nebeker shows

that they

requirements that nurses

e.g.,

R. 1864

-

1868,

d0 guide actual patient

know

is

grossly mistaken.

how

trial

health care

court’s

is

t0

be

A scan 0fthose cited by Ms.

care, not just administrative matters.

For example,

the rules, adequate training of nurses, safeguarding patients

from

incompetent practices, observation and reporting 0f signs and symptoms of a patient, collaboration
with other providers, and record keeping.

Suzanne Nebeker also satisﬁed the
providers.

Her Second Declaration

court’s

trial

‘6

gold standard,” conversing with local

detailed conversations she

had With Susan K. Odom, Idaho

Board ofNursing, Jackie Wagner, and Holly Moore, R. 1950 — 195 1:
I

have,

since

my

Report and Declaration, communicated with other nurse

practitioners within the geographic area 0f

NWSH.

I

have communicated With

Susan K. Odom PhD, RN, FRE, CCRN—K, Associate Executive Director, Practice
and Education, Idaho Board ofNursing Jackie Wagner, FNP from Coeur d Alene,
FNP-BC
Idaho, Who is afﬁliated with Kootenai Hospital, and Holly Moore
from Coeur d Alene, Idaho in a neurosurgical practice, Who had hospital privileges
at NWSH during 2015; and discussed my perceptions of the standard of care for
,

,
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NWSH,
them.

Kootenai, and the geographic area and medical community surrounding

Speciﬁcally,

I

have communicated With these individuals 0n the local

standards of care With respect to the guidelines outlined

by

BON

the

in

State

0f Idaho, national standards of care developed by ANA, education and certiﬁcation
ofFNP designation as providing a foundation for the standards 0f care, the reliance

0n hospital protocols and rules and regulations, hospital privileging

as

deﬁning the

standard 0f care, and, speciﬁc guidelines, evidence based medicine, protocols for
the care 0f the patient at

NWSH

and Kootenai and speciﬁcally for the patient

undergoing anterior cervical neck surgery, post —0perative care, including common
and uncommon risks and outcomes, and the standard of care for the patient who
at NWSH.
Based on those communications, I
have conﬁrmed that my assessment 0f Ms. Fisk’s care and treatment has
been done in accordance with the prevailing standards of care existing at the time.

develops acute abdominal pain

believe

I

While counsel

for

Northwest has made ﬁlings challenging Ms. Nebeker’s accounts of her

conversations, Appellants assert that any attack 0n Ms. Nebeker’s professionalism and knowledge,
as well as the integrity

which she brings

to the table in this matter, is at best very

i11-

founded. Nevertheless, Ms. Nebeker ﬁled a Third Declaration, R. 2 1 53—2 1 66. In that Declaration,
she provided even further explanations 0f her approach t0 deﬁning the local standard. She also
clariﬁed and rebutted the ﬁling

In

by Northwest’s counsel

as follows, R.

2162—2164:

my second declaration, I reported that I had direct telephone communication with

other nurse practitioners within the geographic area

ofNWSH; Jackie Wagner, FNP

from Coeur d Alene, Idaho, Who is afﬁliated with Kootenai Hospital, and Holly
Moore, FNP-BC from Coeur d Alene, Idaho in a neurosurgical practice, Who had
hospital privileges at NWSH during 2015. I spoke with Jackie Wagner, FNP from
Coeur d Alene, Idaho by telephone 0n 0r about June 13, 2015. I did identify myself
as legal consultant working 0n an area case. I did not identify the speciﬁcs 0f the
case, i.e. patient name, date, or any identifying information due t0 compliance with
HIPPA laws. In my communication With Ms. Wagner learn the following: She is
a family nurse practitioner Who works in a clinic setting, she does not practice
hospital medicine but does have an afﬁliation with Kootenai Hospital and could
practice if she were so inclined. She was not and had not been afﬁliated With NWSH
but was aware of its existence. She does not practice in the specialty 0f neurosurgery but is and was familiar With the treatment of abdominal pain as a family
nurse practitioner in the year of 2015. She was familiar With standard of care and
practice guidelines outlined by her education and experience for the care 0f a patient
with acute abdominal pain. We discussed the care that such a patient should
ordinarily receive, including the necessity for evaluation and physical assessment,
developing differential diagnosis, ordering appropriate laboratory
at

very least
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CBC and CMP. We also discussed the necessity 0f ordering a CT scan
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of the abdomen/pelvis to help determine the cause of the abdominal pain. We
discussed the necessity for ordering consultation of GI specialist in a timely
manner. Ms. Wagner was definite in her explanation that this would be the standard
practiced by her at that time, in the Coeur d Alene and Post Falls area, given her
education and credentialing, and the national standards of care outlined by the
ANA.
On or about June 18, 2018, I spoke with Holly Moore, FNP by telephone. I found
her information on the internet through Google search. Her professional
information was listed on Health Care for People. The site lists that she has an
affiliation with NWSH and that she “cooperates with other doctors and specialists
without joining any medical groups.” Her phone number is listed. At no time, was
I aware that she worked with or for Dr. Larsen. She did not at any time during the
conversation identify herself as an employee of Dr. Larsen. I did identify myself as
legal consultant working on an area case. I did not identify the specifics of the case,
i.e. patient name, date, or any identifying information due to compliance with
HIPPA laws. I discussed we discussed her educational background as an FNP-BC,
and that she worked at NWSH and had clinical privileges there in February 2015.
We discussed the process for obtaining those privileges and that she had copies of
those. We also discussed the fact that she worked in the specialty of neurosurgery
at NWSH. At no time, was there a discussion that she was associated with Dr.
Larson. We discussed a hypothetical case whereby a patient had had cervical
surgery and developed acute abdominal pain. She discussed that it was unusual for
a cervical patient to develop acute abdominal symptoms as a result of surgical
intervention. We discussed the course of care that would be the minimum standard.
She agreed that at a minimum, the patient should have received an early physical
examination and evaluation by the nurse practitioner, and that laboratory tests
should have been ordered, CBC, CMP included, and CT of the abdomen/pelvis
should have been ordered at the onset. She also agreed that early specialty
consultation would be in order. The ANA standards of care were discussed, and it
was agreed that they are the national standards and that they apply at the local level.
On or about June 13, 2018, I communicated with Susan K. Odom PhD, RN, FRE,
CCRN-K, Associate Executive Director, Practice and Education, Idaho Board of
Nursing. I identified myself and that I was seeking guidance from the BON on
“local standard of care.” Specifically, I asked if the BON had any documentation
on what was considered the “local standard of care.” Ms. Odom directed me to the
specific areas of IDAPA 23 section 400 and 401. She also shared with me the BON
nursing philosophy. She was unable to identify any documentation that defined
“local standard” but did identify that RN’s and APRN’s in the state of Idaho were
expected to abide by “nationally accepted standards and guidelines, as well as
nursing specialty standards and guidelines.” She emailed me the nursing
philosophy on the same day. She extended an offer to help if I needed further
assistance. The Affidavit by Nancy J. Garrett relating the conversation with Ms.
Odom was shocking. It was flagrantly incomplete, biased, incorrect, and
misleading.
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c. Second Declaration from Timothy Hawkins.
To clarify matters, Timothy Hawkins submitted a Second Declaration. R. 1971 –
1990. Mr. Hawkins clarified the issue of the relationship among CMS, the Joint Commission,
Idaho Health Department and Northwest Specialty Hospital as follows, R. 1972:
It is my understanding that the Court viewed my Declaration as pertaining to Joint
Commission guidelines only, while the description in my Declaration of my
confirmation communication with Mr. Dennis Kelly concerned CMS standards. To
clarify, as a CMS participant, Northwest Specialty Hospital [NWSH] is required by
Federal Law to formulate and implement standards for its facility. CMS does not
specify or create the standards. One way for a hospital such as Northwest Specialty
Hospital to demonstrate compliance with the CMS requirement is to adopt,
implement and accept inspections by the Joint Commission. Therefore, Mr. Kelly’s
confirmation that NWSH was a CMS facility also means that NWSH can comply
with that by its participation with the Joint Commission. It is for that reason that I
conclude that the CMS requirement creates a statewide standard of care applicable
to all hospitals, including NWSH. It is for that reason that I conclude that Joint
Commission guidelines create the local standard of care for NWSH. With this
understanding, my Report and its descriptions/documentation of substandard
acts/omissions/policies at NWSH is grounded in the local standard of care. Another
way of saying this might be to say that Joint Commission standards are local
standards of care for NWSH by virtue of the Idaho Department of Health. Viewed
in this light, my Report does reflect my knowledge of the local standard of care for
NWSH, how those standards were not met, and the impact on the care of Margaret
Fisk.
Sadly, the trial court essentially chose, in an asserted abuse of discretion and violation of case
law, to disregard this and much of Appellants’ supplemental information provided in their Motions
for Reconsideration. Those failures by the trial court are addressed in subsequent sections of this
Brief.

v. Court’s Decision on the Motion for Reconsideration.
The trial court issued its Memorandum Decision and Order: Denying Plaintiffs’ Motions
for Reconsideration on November 13, 2018. R. 2171-2192. It found that because the motion to
reconsider was filed after final judgment was entered it was governed by I.R.C.P. 59(6) and
60(b)—ruling that new evidence is not permitted unless there is a showing of good cause. R. 2183.

APPELLANTS’ BRIEF -29

The court found
The court

that there

was no good cause

t0 consider

in so ruling ignored the supplemental declarations

Hawkins Which

set forth additional

new

evidence. R. 2183-2187.

0f Dr. Kubiak, Ms. Nebeker, and Mr.

information related t0 their familiarity With the local standard

0f care.

The court

also considered the defendants’

awarded McDonald costs

as a matter of right in the

Motions for Costs and Fees and ultimately

amount 0f $2,972.58 and

amount of $4,729.34. R. 2188-2189. The Court refused to grant discretionary

to

Northwest in the

costs to either party

and also denied Northwest’s claim for attorney fees under Idaho Code §12-121 R. 2189.
.

The court refused

to consider

any 0f the declarations ﬁled

in support

of the Motion for

Reconsideration ruling that a motion for reconsideration ﬁled after a ﬁnal judgment

by

I.R.C.P. 59(6) and/or 60(b).

The

is

governed

plaintiffs respectfully identify this ruling as error as will

be

explained below.

IV.

ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Whether the

Northwest where

it

District

relied

ON APPEAL

Court erred in granting summary judgment t0 McDonald and

upon conclusory afﬁdavits

failing to set forth

any applicable standard 0f

care.

2.

Whether the

judgment for

failure t0

Trial Court erred in dismissing the plaintiffs’

claims 0n

summary

demonstrate expert Witness familiarity with the local standard 0f care

pursuant t0 Idaho Code §6—1 012.

3.

in support

4.

Whether the

Trial Court erred in failing to consider the plaintiffs’ supplemental ﬁlings

of their Motion for Reconsideration.

Whether Defendant McDonald
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is

responsible for the acts and omissions of his

employee nurse practitioner Jessica Scholtz.
5.

Whether the Court erred

6.

Whether Appellant

is

in granting the

Defendants their costs as a matter of right,

an award 0f attorney fees and costs 0n appeal.

entitled t0

V.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
A.

Summary Judgment.

Under Idaho law, summary judgment
0n

and

Smith

v.

that the

moving party

is

Meridian Joint School

applying this standard, the

trial

moving party and should draw
in favor

1226

(1

entitled to

Dist.

court

all

N0.
is

proper “if pleadings, depositions and admissions

show

ﬁle, together With the afﬁdavits, if any,

fact

is

that there is

judgment

2,

n0 genuine issue

as t0

any material

as a matter 0f law.” I.R.C.P. 56(0); see also

128 Idaho 714, 718, 918 P.2d 583, 587 (1996).

t0 liberally construe all disputed facts in favor

reasonable inferences and conclusions supported

of the party opposing the motion.

McKay v. Owens,

In

of the non-

by

the record

130 Idaho 148, 152, 937 P. 2d 1222,

997).

If the adverse party set forth facts sufﬁcient to establish that there is a

material fact, then the

moving party

is

not entitled to

Idaho 166, 170, 16 P.3d 263, 267 (2000).

A

party against

whom

genuine issue 0f

summary judgment. Baxter

The summaryjudgment rule

a claim, counterclaim, 0r cross—claim

v.

Craney, 135

(I.R.C.P. 56(b)) provides:

is

asserted, 0r a

any time, move With or Without supporting
in
afﬁdavits for a summaryjudgment
that party’s favor as to all or any party thereof.
Provided, a motion for summary judgment must be ﬁled at least 6O days before the
trial date 0r ﬁled within 7 days from the date of the order setting the case for trial,
whichever is later, unless otherwise ordered by the court.
declaratory judgment

The Court
the motion and

is

sought may,

at

thus duty—bound t0 liberally construe the record in favor of the party opposing

must draw
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all

reasonable inferences and conclusions from the evidence in favor of

the party opposing

summary judgment.

Friel

v.

Boise City Hous. Auth., 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887

P.2d 29, 30 (1994).
In the context 0f a medical malpractice claim, the liberal granting 0f summary judgment in

favor ofphysicians has been speciﬁcally denounced. In Clarke

v.

Prenger, 114 Idaho 766 (1988),

the Court stated the following:

We take this

occasion to express our disapproval 0f What appears to be a growing

among the trial courts 0f this State dismissing medical-negligence
Summary Judgment point on the basis that the plaintiff’s experts

practice

cases at

the

are not

sufﬁciently familiar With the standard of care t0 be expected from the defendant
physicians....0n the other hand,

it

appears that

some 0f our

trial

judges failed to

recognize their obligation to construe not only evidence before the court but
reasonable inferences that

As

will be demonstrated,

judgment and the

trial

ﬂow therefrom most favorable to

ample evidence was presented by the

the non-moving

all

party.

plaintiffs t0 survive

summary

court erred in granting the defendants” motions.

VI.

ARGUMENT
A. McDonald and Northwest submitted conclusory, not evidentiary, afﬁdavits to
support their motions for summary judgment. The trial court overlooked this
failure.
Summary Judgment should never have been considered due t0 the
inadequate ﬁlings by the defendants.

The Summary Judgment Motions of both Defendants, Dr. McDonald and Northwest
Specialty Hospital, were not supported with sufﬁcient afﬁdavits or other admissible evidence to

meet

their initial

1.

burdens of proof for summary judgment.

McDonald provided n0 factual 0r evidentiary support
Summary Judgment related t0 the local standard 0f care.

Dr.

for his

Motion for

For his Motion for Summary Judgment, McDonald provided absolutely n0
evidence

that:

1)

facts or

described the local standard of care for his profession, or 2) described

McDonald purportedly complied With
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the local standard.

how

The Declaration 0f Nathan
Judgment

is

S.

Ohler in support of McDonald’s Motion for

devoid of an afﬁdavit or any other evidence from McDonald establishing the standard

of care for his profession. R. 1475—1539.
Support of Motion for
0r

Summary

A thorough reading

of McDonald’s

Memorandum

Summary Judgment discloses no attempt to deﬁne the local

how McDonald complied with

the standard. R. 1457

—

standard of care

memorandum

1474. McDonald’s

in

does

not provide any facts, evidence, 0r even argument that established the standard of care. The closest

McDonald’s memorandum approached

the issue

was

to

M

that “It is undisputable that Fisk’s

medical records, in and of themselves, do not provide the basis for actual knowledge 0f the
standard 0f care,” citing Rhodehouse

By

noting

this,

McDonald

v.

Stutts,

125 Idaho 208, 201, 868 P.2d. 1224, 1228 (1994).

negates his reliance 0n the ﬁlings of Northwest, which

McDonald

purported to incorporate, to the extent the Hospital’s ﬁlings attempted t0 establish the local
standard

by reference

t0

medical records.

Northwest provided n0 factual

2.

Summary Judgment

01'

evidentiary support for

at

providing competent factual support for

Summary Judgment. The Hospital provided an afﬁdavit from Dr.

area,

he provided n0

—

880. While Dr. Larson described a

facts or evidence

Jeffrey Larson, a

its

how

at the

McDonald admitted that

was What could be seen

would

’
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we

familiarize

His closest

shall see, stated the

As noted

above, even

the contents 0f medical records d0 not establish the standard of care.

Dr. Larson’s afﬁdavit describes, in
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in the medical records.

in the

time of Margaret Fisk’s

his experience

approach was reference to an afﬁdavit of nurse Denise Fowler, who, as

for

Coeur d’Alene

himself with the local standard — but he never said What that local standard was.

local standard for nurses

Motion

good deal ofhis own experience

of what standard of care was

Larson provided a detailed description 0f

injuries. Dr.

Motion for

related to the local standard of care.

Northwest made a vague attempt

neurosurgeon. R. 863

its

some

detail, the care

rendered to Ms. Fisk. That does

not establish what the standard 0f care was for any profession.

considered as a ﬁrst-order assessment of negligence

-

or

its

Dr. Larson’s afﬁdavit could be

absence — but

it

does not describe the

standard of care.

The afﬁdavit of Denise Fowler does not
length and incorporation

much of Ms.

establish

what the standard of care was, despite

Fisk’s hospital ﬁle. R. 889-1380.

The only direct statement

about the standard 0f care from nurse Fowler was “[t]he standard 0f health care to Which
other nurses are held

I

is set

forth in the attached medical records identiﬁed as Exhibit “B,”

have personally reviewed.” R. 892. Risking redundancy,

its

this is insufﬁcient

I

and

ofwhich

according t0

Rhodehouse, supra, and McDonald’s ﬁlings.
3.

Appellants raised this issue in their

initial

memoranda opposing summary

judgment.
In their initial

Memoranda opposing Summary Judgment by both Defendants,

brought the issue to the court’s attention.

Exemplary excerpts from

Plaintiffs’ ﬁlings

[See, e.g., Record, pp.

Plaintiffs

1540 — 1564, 1565 — 1587.]

demonstrate the inadequacy 0f Defendants’ ﬁlings:

A

motion for summary judgment 0n the local standard of care must deﬁne the
applicable standard. Suhadolnik v. Pressman, 151 Idaho 110, 254 P3d 11, (201 1),
provides guidance as t0 the burden of proof for a summary judgment motion
premised on the local standard 0f care. Dr. Pressman was an ophthalmologist. At
issue was Whether he failed to learn about Plaintiff Suhadolnik’s use of the drug
Flomax.
Dr. Pressman

was deposed, and he

summary judgment. The

also ﬁled an afﬁdavit in support of his

motion for

court acknowledged that an afﬁdavit to support motion for

judgment must provide “a description of the standard and alleged compliance With
Suhadolnik, supra, at 254 P.3d 24,

The court did not provide

fn. 4.

summary

that standard.”

[Emphasis added]

the Pressman afﬁdavit in

its

opinion.

It

acknowledged

its

requirement in other comments, noting that Pressman’s afﬁdavit did describe What the local
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standard was. Id. With a compliant affidavit, the burden of proof on the local standard of care for
summary judgment purposes is shifted to the Plaintiff. Suhadolnik, supra, at 254 P.3d 16. Absent
the movant’s affidavit that describes specifically what the local standard of care is, that burden
does not shift, and Appellants should not be required to provide conflicting evidence on the subject.
The Affidavits filed by Defendant Northwest do NOT specify what the local standard of
care is. The affidavit of Denise Fowler, provided by Northwest, states only that the standard of
care is “set forth in the attached medical records identified as Exhibit “B,” which I have personally
reviewed. R. 892. A thorough review of the medical records cited reveals absolutely no description
of any medical standard of care, whether for a hospital, doctor, nurse practitioner, nurses, or any
other category of care giver.
McDonald’s own filings acknowledge that what is contained in the medical records does
not establish the standard of care. “It is indisputable that Fisk’s records, in and of themselves, do
not provide the basis for actual knowledge of the applicable standard of care. See Rhodehouse v.
Stutts, 125 Idaho 208, 212, 868 P.2d 1224, 1228, (1994).” R. 1470.
Northwest cannot legitimately say that the records set the local standard of care. If this
were the case, then the local standard of care for any case would be whatever treatment was
provided. This view is affirmed by the Vernon Kubiak, above, in which he noted that the Fowler
affidavit does not describe a standard of care
The Affidavit of Dr. Jeffrey Larson does not provide a description of the local standard of
care. It simply incorporates what nurse Fowler states – that the contents of medical records
establish the standard of care. “With specific reference to the Plaintiff, Margaret Fisk, the standard
of health care practice to which registered nurses are held is set forth in the medical records
identified as Exhibit “B,” to the Affidavit of Denise Fowler, R.N., which I have personally
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reviewed.” Dr. Larson’s affidavit is otherwise devoid of any description of what is/was the local
standard of care.
It is instructive to pause and consider the state of Defendants’ assertions at this point:
1) No description of the standard of care for a hospital is provided.
2) A registered nurse’s statement that the medical records themselves describes the
standard of care is all that is provided.
3) No description of the standard of care for a physician such as McDonald is provided.
4) No description of the standard of care for a nurse practitioner like McDonald’s nurse
practitioner, Jessica Sholtz, is provided.
Discussing whether a review of deposition testimony might be sufficient to learn and
describe the standard of care, the Suhadolnik, supra, court made the following observations:
[w]hile it may be acceptable for an expert to demonstrate knowledge of a local
standard of care by reviewing deposition testimony, that testimony must clearly
articulate the local standard for the particular time, place and specialty at issue in
order to meet the foundational requirements of I.C. Section 6-1013.
Under these circumstances, Northwest failed to provide a description of the standard of
care. And the burden of proof to establish the local standard of care is not shifted to Plaintiffs. R.
1574 – 1580.
4. This issue is currently before the Court though in a somewhat different
context.
In Eldridge v. West, et al., Sup.Ct. Docket No. 45214, the issue of the sufficiency of the
movant’s affidavits was evaluated in light of Rule 56(c)(4), IRCP, which requires that affidavits
be made on personal knowledge and “set out facts that would be admissible in evidence.” The
rule does not allow for conclusory statements such as the standard of care is reflected in the medical
records.
Plaintiffs’ counsel in Eldridge acknowledged the decision in Foster v. Traul, 141 Idaho
890, 120 P.3d 278 (2005), which has been the basis of assertions that conclusory, non-factual

APPELLANTS’ BRIEF -36

statements might be sufficient to establish the local standard of care to satisfy a movant’s duties
under Rule 56(c)(4). Plaintiffs’ counsel in Eldridge has urged the Court to overrule Foster,
explicitly, based on Mattox v. Life Care Centers of America, Inc., 157 Idaho 468, 337 P.3d 627
(2014).
The Appellants agree with counsel’s arguments in Eldridge that Mattox implicitly nullifies
Foster, which should be explicitly overruled. In summary, the Eldridge argument notes that
Mattox requires affidavits, for either side, “must contain admissible evidence. In a malpractice
case that would include at a minimum the identification of the standard(s) of care at issue in the
case.” Mattox, supra.
The Mattox court noted, at 337 P.3d 627, 633, that “the guiding question is simply whether
the affidavit alleges facts which, taken as true, show the proposed expert has actual knowledge of
the applicable standard of care.” This is another way to state Rule 56 in our context.
Plaintiffs agree with the arguments in Eldridge that concepts in Maddox should control.
Weighed against these guidelines, the affidavits of Northwest and McDonald should have been
interpreted as insufficient to ripen the summary judgment inquiry. The burdens placed on
Appellants to demonstrate knowledge of the local standard, and how they were violated, were far
greater than those imposed on Northwest and McDonald. If the burdens were applied equally, the
Fisks’ experts would have merely needed to say they knew the local standards without providing
any factual basis for what the standards were and how they were violated. Despite this grotesque
inequity imposed by statute and court decision, the following section of this brief will demonstrate
how completely Appellants’ experts satisfied that task.

B. The trial court misapplied the analysis for the local standard of care in ignoring
the voluminous evidence produced by the Appellants’ experts demonstrating
actual knowledge.
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The volume 0f facts and evidence offered by Appellants to

establish

knowledge 0fthe

local

standard 0f care occupies considerable space in the Record 0n Appeal. In general, Appellants”
experts explained

RULES

how NATIONAL STANDARDS, STATE STANDARDS, and HOSPITAL

must be the standards 0f care applicable
1.

to

Northwest and

Mc Donald.

Legal Discussion.

In the years since the imposition 0f Idaho

Code §6—1012 and 1013

in Idaho, this Court has

been presented with a multitude of appeals concerning how, in the absence of a local care
provider’s testimony, plaintiffs’ experts can establish familiarity with the local standard 0f

care.

Knowledge 0f the

The most

local standard 0f care

can be established by several different methods.

pertinent decisions in this regard include

Mattox

v.

Life

Care Centers ofAmerica, Ina,

157 Idaho 468, 474, 337 P.3d 627, 633, (2014), cited above, and Suhadolnik
Idaho 110, 254 P3d 11, (201

1),

v.

Pressman, 151

also cited above.

In sum, according to these cases,

mechanisms

for demonstrating

knowledge 0f the

standard 0f care include direct testimony, consultation With a local professional,

of the same specialty. Newberry

v.

local

Who need not be

Martens, 142 Idaho 284, 127 P.3d 187 (2005), reliance 0n

deposition testimony that describes local standards or practices. Suhadolnik, supra, government
regulations, such as Idaho laws

and regulations, national governmental requirements, such as

CMS

requirements, and guidelines 0f national organizations, Mattox, supra, and Suhadolnik, supra. and

board certiﬁcations, guidelines associated with national board certiﬁcations.

Id.

Mattox, supra, provided the following guidance:
This Court does not require that an afﬁdavit include particular phrases 0r state that
the expert acquainted himself 0r herselfwith the applicable standard 0f care in

some

formulaic manner in order to establish adequate foundation under Section 6—1013.
See, e.g.,

Bybee

V.

German, 157 Idaho

169, 178—79, 335 P.3d 14,

23—24 (2014)

(holding that a district court erred in excluding an expert afﬁdavit simply because
the out-of—area expert claimed to have learned the applicable standard of care

APPELLANTS’ BRIEF

-38

by

consulting with an

anonymous

local expert);

Newberrv V. Martens, 142 Idaho 284,

292, 127 P.3d 187, 195 (2005) (holding that an ophthalmologist demonstrated

knowledge of the applicable standard 0f care for family practice physicians
“by practicing alongside family practice physicians ..., by providing and obtaining
referrals, and by discussing patient care with them,” though the ophthalmologist
never explicitly asked about the standard 0f care); Grover V. Smith, 137 Idaho 247,
253, 46 P.3d 1105, 1111 (2002) (holding that an out-of-area dentist demonstrated
actual knowledge of the applicable standard 0f care by demonstrating familiarity
With state licensing requirements governing the practice 0f dentistry). The guiding
question is simply whether the afﬁdavit alleges facts which, taken as true, show the
proposed expert has actual knowledge 0f the applicable standard of care. In
addressing that question, courts must 100k t0 the standard 0f care at issue, the
proposed expert’s grounds for claiming knowledge of that standard and
determine—employing a measure 0f common sense—whether those grounds
would likely give rise t0 knowledge of that standard. The obligation t0 demonstrate
actual knowledge of the local standard of care is not intended t0 be “an overly
burdensome requirement...” Frank V. E. Shoshone Hosp., 114 Idaho 480, 482, 757
P.2d 1199, 1201 ( 1988). Nor is the standard static and ﬁrmly rooted in past medical
practices. Standards 0f care are sensitive to evolving changes in the way health care
services are delivered in the various communities 0f our State. Indeed, the Court
has recognized that “governmental regulation, development of regional and
national provider organizations, and greater access to the ﬂow of medical
information,” have provided “various avenues by Which a plaintiff may proceed to
establish a standard 0f care....” Suhadolnik V. Pressman, 151 Idaho 110, 121, 254
P.3d 11, 22 120111.
actual

These Mattox guidelines have not been changed or altered since

it

primary cases have referenced Mattox in the local standards context, Samples
179, 384 P.3d 943 (2015) and

Navo

v.

v.

was decided. Two
Hanson, 161 Idaho

Bingham Memorial Hosp, 160 Idaho 363, 373 P.3d 681

(2016). Neither case changed the Mattox guidelines in any respect.

This court

is

presented with the opportunity t0 dispel the myths perpetrated by the local

standards statutes and case law.

The myth

State or national standards of care.

a Medicare provider

0f care.

It is

a

by

a

that a hospital like

myth

contracting t0 abide
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is

Northwest operates

to suggest that a hospital

by Joint Commission

myth t0 say that Northwest was not obliged to

and Regulations. A11 this

’

It is

is

true for a physician like

at less

Which qualiﬁes

than

itself as

guidelines has a lesser standard

act in accord with Idaho State Statutes

McDonald and his employee nurse practitioner

Sholtz. It is a myth that the contents of a set of medical records can establish the local standard.
It is a myth that an expert can say he/she looked at the care given, and it complied with a standard
of care which was never described. Minimal summary judgment requirements mandate a
description of what the standard is – not the self-defining conclusion that whatever the providers
did established the standard.
2. Conundrums.
The trial court’s view was “tunnel vision” in the sense that Judge Mitchell stubbornly
held to a position that someone “local” to Coeur d’Alene or Post Falls was required to say, for
example, “yes, there are Idaho State Statutes and Regulations, and they provide the local
standard of care for Northwest Specialty Hospital, Dr. McDonald, and his employee.”
While Judge Mitchell paid lip service to the notion that plaintiffs have great difficulty
getting local experts, and that there are exceptions to the requirement of an actual local expert
witness, he rigidly insisted that Appellants produce an affidavit, declaration, or evidence of
consultation with a local practitioner to prove Appellants’ experts were familiar with the local
standard. The conundrum – it is impossible to get local witnesses to cooperate, but the Court
requires cooperation in some form by a local witness. That is not the intent of the cited Supreme
Court decisions.
A second conundrum is the notion that the existence of a local standard of care must be
established “from the bottom up,” meaning, in the eyes of the Court and Respondents, that
someone from the local medical community must testify that State or National standards have
been adopted locally. For example, Respondents and the trial court would assert that a local
professional would need to testify that the Respondents adopted State laws. Appellants assert
that the impact of a State Law or Regulation on the local standard of care doesn’t need further
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explaining – it is the law and Appellants should not be saddled with the impossible burden of
finding a local provider to say the hospital, doctor, or nurse practitioner are required to abide by
state law.
Yet another conundrum was the trial court’s repeated view that some local testimony was
necessary to establish that existing local standards were replaced by State or National Standards.
It is both ironic and a conundrum that the trial court did not require Defendants to describe, either
generally or in detail, exactly what the local standards in place were. What were the local
standards? None were established by the Defendants. Therefore, to require Appellants to produce
information about replacement of a non-disclosed standard was a specious requirement. In fact,
the local standards were expressed, not replaced, in the Hospital’s own policies and through
national accreditation and guidelines such as those from the ANA.
C. The court should have considered the Appellants’ supplemental declarations filed
in support of the Motion for Reconsideration.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 11.2(b)(1) provides:
A motion to reconsider any order of the trial court entered before final Judgment,
may be made at any time prior to or within 14 days after entry of a final judgment.
A motion to reconsider an order entered after the entry of final judgment must be
made within 14 days after entry of the order.
The rule allows a motion to reconsider after entry of final judgment and case law allows
the presentation of new or additional evidence as well. On a motion to reconsider additional facts
may be considered. Coeur d’Alene Mining Co., v. First National Bank, 118 Idaho 812, 800 P.2d
1026 (1990). A party is allowed to present new facts on a motion for reconsideration. Johnson v.
Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 147 P. 3d 100 (Ct. App. 2006).
The court must consider new evidence bearing on the correctness of a summary judgment
order if the motion to reconsider is filed within fourteen (14) days after a final judgment issue.
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Agrrisource, Inc. v. Johnson, 156 Idaho 903 (2014). A review of the district court’s denial of a
motion for reconsideration is de novo. Bremer, LLC., v. E. Greenacres Irrigation Dist., 155 Idaho
736, 744, 316 P.ed 652, 660 (2013).
With respect to the Appellants’ Motion to Reconsider, Appellants assert this right pursuant
to Rule 11.2(b)(1) and its predecessor Rule 11(a)(2)(B). While no substantive interpretations of
Rule 11.2(b)(1) have been issued by the Supreme Court since the Rule’s amendment in 2016,
Appellants assert that the issue of whether new evidence may/should be considered in a motion
for reconsideration should be the same for each version of the Rule.

The rule allows the

presentation of new or additional evidence. Additional facts may be considered. Coeur d’Alene
Mining Co., v. First National Bank, 118 Idaho 812, 800 P.2d 1026 (1990). A party is allowed to
present new facts. Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 147 P. 3d 100 (Ct. App. 2006). This applies
to medical malpractice cases.
Appellants submitted new information, both evidentiary and explanatory, in their Motions
for Reconsideration. R. 1924 – 1990; 1991 – 2034. Ramos v. Dixon, 144 Idaho 32, 37, 156 P.3d
533 (2007). The Court should have considered the additional information. Effectively, it did not.
It should also be noted that Rule 11.2(b)(1) makes no distinction, explicitly or implicitly, in the
standard of review for motions filed either before or after final judgment.
Wickel v. Chamberlain, 159 Idaho 532, 363 P.3d 854 (2015) is very instructive in this
context. Wickel stood for the proposition that materials submitted in support of a motion to
reconsider a summary judgment are to be considered by the trial court in the same manner as
materials submitted previously. In other words, new evidence or new information/arguments
should be considered as if they had been submitted in the initial oppositions to Summary Judgment.
Appellants contend that the supplemental Declarations submitted should have been considered in

APPELLANTS’ BRIEF -42

the same light and given the same weight as if they had been submitted in Appellants’ original
oppositions.
The trial court did not consider the additional information submitted in the reconsideration
motions in this light. The trial court mistakenly applied evaluative tests grounded in Rules 59 and
60 requiring, for example, a showing of good cause. The trial court effectively disregarded
Appellants’ additional evidence and assessment for their purported failure to show good cause and
other factors mandated in Rule 59 and Rule 60 proceedings.
Neither version of the rules on reconsideration incorporate Rule 50 or 60 mandates. To the
contrary, both versions of the reconsideration rule explicitly exclude the reconsideration route in
the context of Rules 59 and 60. “No motion to reconsider an order of the trial court entered on any
motion filed under Rules . . . 50(a), 59 (e), 59.1, 60(a) or 60(b) may be made.” Rule 11.2(b)(2).
By its very terms, the reconsideration rule says it may not be utilized in Rule 59 or 60 proceedings.
It follows that standards and tests under those rules do not apply to Motion for Reconsideration.
The court erroneously relied on the decision in Johnson v. Lambros, 143 Idaho 468, 147
P.3d 100 (2006), as mandating application of Rule 59 or 60 criteria for a Rule 11.2(b)(1) motion
for reconsideration. R. 2183. A thorough review of that case reveals no dicta nor holding to that
effect. Interpreting the prior Rule 11(a)(2)B), the Lambros Court first observed that while
submission of new evidence was allowed under the rule, it was not required. The sole “holding”
of Lambros was “we hold that the absence of new evidence accompanying Johnson’s motion for
reconsideration did not, standing alone, require that the motion be denied.” Lambros, supra, at
473, 105. Similarly, neither Lowe v. Lym, 103 Idaho 259, 646 P. 2d 1030 (1982), nor Hendrickson
v. Sun Valley Corporation, Inc., 98 Idaho 133, 559 P.2d 749 (1977), cited by the court, R. 2183,
support the proposition that a Rule 11.2(b)(1) motion be decided on Rule 59 or 60 criteria. Lym

APPELLANTS’ BRIEF -43

considered a Rule 59(6) motion only, not a motion under an earlier version of Rule I 1

Hendrickson involved a Rule 60(b) motion and was disposed 0n issues related

t0 the timing

.

of the

motion, not substantive considerations for either Rule 60(b) 0r Rule 1 1.2(b) (I).
Since the

trial

court mistakenly applied the

motions for reconsideration under Rule

The

test the court

wrong standards of review

I 1.2(b)(2), the

ﬁndings and reasoning are plainly wrong.

should have applied, as above described, was t0 analyze the

information exactly that same as in the original motions for

D.

McDonald

is

t0 Appellants’

new

evidence and

summary judgment.

responsible for the acts and omissions 0f his employee nurse

practitioner Jessica Sholtz.

Another myth perpetuated by the Respondents and the court

is

that

Mc

responsible for the acts and omissions 0f his employee nurse practitioner Sholtz.

Donald

To

is

not

sustain this

myth, the Respondents and the court ignored the following provision in Idaho law, Idaho Code

§30-1306:

Any

ofﬁcer, shareholder, agent 0r employee 0f a corporation organized under this

remain personally and fully liable and accountable for any negligent 0r
wrongful acts or misconduct committed by him, 0r by any person under his direct
supervision and control, While rendering professional services 0n behalf 0f the
act shall

corporation t0 the person for Whom such professional services were being rendered.

This

to

is

not an

uncommon legal

concept

do business as corporations or limited

personally responsible for his/her
responsible for

all

own

When professionals

liability entities.

actions.

like doctors 0r lawyers

The supervising professional remains

This statute also makes the professional

those under “his direct supervision and control.”

ignorance that Appellants were holding

choose

The Respondents

MC Donald responsible for Sholtz.

feign

There were numerous

discovery approaches t0 the subject.

Initially,

multiple

McDonald’s physician’s
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medical references to

assistant.

Sholtz

by Northwest personnel were

t0

This was reﬂected in Appellants’ Complaint. R. 20, paragraphs

21 and 26, R. 21, paragraphs 27 and 29. While Appellants do not present this as a dispositive fact,
it is evidence that the Hospital viewed Sholtz as representing McDonald.
The court apparently relied solely on the notion that a Complaint must specifically allege
a matter such as Mc Donald’s responsibility for Sholtz. This reliance on the Complaint only was
ill-founded.
If the inquiry is to be limited to the pleadings only, Appellants satisfied their requirements
for a concise statement of facts under Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8. As noted above, Appellants
pled that Scholtz was the physician’s assistant for Mc Donald. This alone is sufficiently puts
McDonald on notice that he was allegedly responsible for Sholtz. But what did Mc Donald plead?
He pled an absence of sufficient information to admit or deny that Sholtz was his responsibility.
R. 141, paragraphs 20 and 21. (If Mc Donald didn’t have enough information to admit or deny that
Sholtz was his physician’s assistant, then how could the court expect Appellants to have that
information to include in their Complaint?)

McDonald failed in his responsibility to plead

defenses as required by Rule 8(c), which requires all matters of defense, not just those explicitly
stated in the rule, to “affirmatively state any avoidance or affirmative defense.”
If this issue was subject to determination simply by reference to the rules of pleading, we
can see that Mc Donald’s defenses were deficient. The court’s criticism of delays in raising the
issue is equally applicable to both parties. As noted above, Appellants’ counsel made it abundantly
clear through the entire course of the case that they were seeking information on the exact nature
of the relationship between McDonald and Sholtz, which McDonald had represented in pleadings
that he didn’t have enough information to admit or deny. Appellants’ efforts in this regard were
documented in their Memorandum Opposing Mc Donald’s Summary Judgment Motion. R. 1555
– 1558.
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Neither the Motion nor the Memorandum in Support for McDonald’s Summary Judgment
Motion stated a defense that Mc Donald was not responsible for Sholtz. At best, in a mistaken
recitation of undisputed facts, Mc Donald mentioned that the Complaint did not explicitly claim
an agency relationship, that Sholtz was a nurse practitioner, not a physician’s assistant, and that
Mc Donald had a business entity called North Idaho Neurosurgery & Spine. R. 1458. Nothing in
Mc Donald’s motion or memorandum suggested that he was entitled to immunity from
responsibility for Sholtz.
Understanding the intent of Mc Donald’s summary judgment motion as challenging the
existence of an agency relationship between him and Sholtz, Appellants stressed several factors
establishing the employer-employee relationship evidenced by an employment agreement between
Mc Donald and Sholtz, R. 1557 – 1558. Those factors were:
1) Sholtz was to carry out the duties in a job description. That job description has not yet
been found or produced. In any event, it shows McDonald had control over the details
of Ms. Sholtz’s job duties.
2) A “salary” of $100,000.00 was specified.
3) A bonus program was offered.
4) Health, life and dental insurance was provided.
5) There would be eligibility for participation in a 401(k) plan.
6) There were paid holidays and accrued personal time.
7) The relationship was designated as an “at will” employment.
8) McDonald’s professional liability coverage also covered Jessica Sholtz.
Evidence of these factors was provided to the court in Appellants’ Opposition, R. 1557, footnotes
13 and 14, referencing Mc Donald’s deposition testimony. Detailed information about the
McDonald and Sholtz relationship was requested in Appellant’s Second and Third Requests for
Production.
Further evidence (not new evidence) of the relationship between McDonald and Sholtz was
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detailed to the court in Appellants’ Motion and Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Reconsideration, R. 1991 – 2034. The following summarized those factors, R. 1996, with
references to Sholtz and Mc Donald Depositions:
1. In Ms. Sholtz’s own words, about McDonald: “[h]e is my supervising physician and I
look up to him as a father figure.”
2. Defendant McDonald hired Jessica Sholtz to be a mid-level provider in his practice.
3. A mid-level provider was either a nurse practitioner or a physician’s assistant.
4. Defendant McDonald “never envisioned a mid-level provider as practicing
independently in my practice.”
5. “For the most part, the mid-level provider and myself work side by side, physically in
each other’s presence . . . . So we are in clinic together.” McDonald goes on to explain
other aspects of the close relationship with Jessica Sholtz.
6. McDonald signed off on all of Sholtz’s orders because he was responsible for her
actions. He signed all orders that came from Sholtz.
All factors, and all evidence, conclusively established that Mc Donald was the supervisor
of Sholtz. Regardless of whether he was the employer, or whether the employer was North Idaho
Spine, Mc Donald was Sholtz’s supervisor and responsible for her actions by virtue of the
provisions of Idaho Code § 30-1306, above.
Appellants supplemented this argument with comments concerning their Motion to
Amend, R. 1897. That Motion, and the accompanying proposed amended pleading, R. 1901, did
not attempt to add a party nor a cause of action. It simply clarified Appellants’ position and pled
the specifics of the statute. The court’s assessment of the amendment issue was therefore
misguided with references to amendment to add parties or causes of action. The proposed
amendment simply designated the statutory mandate that McDonald is responsible for Sholtz.
The Appellants stress that their failure to plead agency or the above statute was not fatal to
their claims against McDonald. They are aware of no requirement, for example, that a Complaint
alleging injuries due to a defendant running a red light require citation of the statute creating the
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obligation to stop be pled. Likewise, they are aware of no requirement that a pleading against an
employer or supervisor specify that the employee was the agent of the employer.
Appellants pled that the “treatment provided” by Mc Donald was negligent – and that
treatment included providing Sholtz’s services. Appellants pled that Sholtz’s care was deficient.
All these factors, taken together, established Mc Donald’s responsibilities for Sholtz.
It is instructive to contemplate if this this case were tried to a jury with only Northwest as
a Defendant. The verdict form would certainly include a space for the assignment of fault to
Sholtz. Assuming the jury assigned fault to her, the quoted statute requires that McDonald be
responsible for that negligence.
E. The Respondents should not have been awarded costs as a matter of right.
The court granted the respondents costs as a matter of right determining that they were the
prevailing party. In order to grant costs as a matter of right such a determination must be made.
Given the clear errors made in the court below the Appellants request that the Judgment allowing
costs as a matter of right be vacated.
F. Appellants are entitled to attorney’s fees and costs on appeal.
The Appellants are entitled to attorney’s fees and costs under Idaho Code §12-121 and
Idaho Appellate Rules 40 and 41. Section 12-121 and I.A.R. 41 allow for attorney fees and costs
in a civil action where a matter was defended frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation.
I.A.R. 40 allows for the award of costs to the prevailing party on appeal. The District Court granted
summary judgment without the defendants making a proper foundation, disregarded the
Appellants voluminous evidence demonstrating knowledge of the standard of care and ignored
additional evidence submitted by the Appellants on their request for reconsideration. For these
reasons, the Appellants are entitled to attorney fees and costs on appeal.
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VII.

CONCLUSION
The Appellants

respectfully request that the Court reverse and

remand

the case for further

proceedings.
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